mirror of
git://git.acid.vegas/IRCP.git
synced 2024-11-23 00:16:41 +00:00
86 lines
6.0 KiB
Markdown
86 lines
6.0 KiB
Markdown
# Internet Relay Chat Probe (IRCP)
|
|
|
|
![](.screens/ircp.png)
|
|
|
|
*TRIPLE 6 SEVEN OCULOUS*
|
|
|
|
A robust information gathering tool for large scale reconnaissance on [Internet Relay Chat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Relay_Chat) servers, made for future usage with [internetrelaychat.org](https://internetrelaychat.org) for public statistics on the protocol.
|
|
|
|
Meant to be used in combination with [masscan](https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan) checking **0.0.0.0/0** *(the entire IPv4 range)* for port **6667**.
|
|
|
|
The idea is to create a *proof-of-concept* documenting how large-scale information gathering on the IRC protocol can be malicious & invasive to privacy.
|
|
|
|
## Order of Operations
|
|
First, an attempt to connect using SSL/TLS on port 6697 is made, which will fall back to a standard connection on port 6667 if it fails. The **RPL_ISUPPORT** *(005)* response is checked for the `SSL=` option to try & locate secure ports.
|
|
|
|
Once connected, server information is gathered from `ADMIN`, `CAP LS`, `MODULES -all`, `VERSION`, `IRCOPS`, `MAP`, `INFO`, `LINKS`, `STATS p`, & `LIST` replies. An attempt to register a nickname is then made by trying to contact NickServ.
|
|
|
|
Lastly, every channel is joined with a `WHO` command sent & every new nick found gets a `WHOIS` sent.
|
|
|
|
Once we have finishing scanning a server, the information found is saved to a JSON file. The data in the logs are stored in categories based on [numerics](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/internet-relay-chat/random/master/numerics.txt) *(001 is RPL_WELCOME, 322 is RPL_LIST, etc)* & events *(JOIN, MODE, KILL, etc)*.
|
|
|
|
Everything is done in a *carefully* throttled manner for stealth to avoid detection. An extensive amount research on IRC daemons, services, & common practices used by network administrators was done & has fine tuned this project to be able to evade common triggers that thwart what we are doing.
|
|
|
|
## Opt-out
|
|
The IRC networks we scanned are PUBLIC networks...any person can freely connect & parse the same information. Send your hate mail to [scan@internetrelaychat.org](mailto://scan@internetrelaychat.org)
|
|
|
|
## Config
|
|
###### Settings
|
|
| Setting | Default Value | Description |
|
|
| ------------- | ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| `errors` | `True` | Show errors in console |
|
|
| `errors_conn` | `False` | Show connection errors in console |
|
|
| `log_max` | `5000000` | Maximum log size *(in bytes)* before starting another |
|
|
| `nickname` | `"IRCP"` | IRC nickname *(`None` = random)* |
|
|
| `username` | `"ircp"` | IRC username *(`None` = random)* |
|
|
| `realname` | `"internetrelaychat.org"` | IRC realname *(`None` = random)* |
|
|
| `ns_mail` | `"scan@internetrelaychat.org"` | NickServ email address *(`None` = random)* |
|
|
| `ns_pass` | `"changeme"` | NickServ password *(`None` = random)* |
|
|
| `vhost` | `None` | Bind to a specific IP address |
|
|
|
|
###### Throttle
|
|
| Setting | Default Value | Description |
|
|
| ---------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| `channels` | `3` | Maximum number of channels to scan at once |
|
|
| `delay` | `300` | Delay before registering nick *(if enabled)* & sending `LIST` |
|
|
| `join` | `10` | Delay between channel `JOIN` |
|
|
| `nick` | `300` | Delay between every random `NICK` change |
|
|
| `part` | `10` | Delay before `PART` from channel |
|
|
| `seconds` | `300` | Maximum seconds to wait when throttled for `JOIN` |
|
|
| `threads` | `100` | Maximum number of threads running |
|
|
| `timeout` | `30` | Timeout for all sockets |
|
|
| `whois` | `5` | Delay between `WHOIS` requests |
|
|
| `ztimeout` | `200` | Timeout for zero data from server |
|
|
|
|
## Preview
|
|
![](.screens/preview.png)
|
|
|
|
## Threat Scope
|
|
While IRC is an generally unfavored chat protocol as of 2023 *(roughly 7,000 networks)*, it still has a beating heart **(over 300,000 users & channels)* with potential for user growth & active development being done on [IRCv3](https://ircv3.net/) protocol implementations.
|
|
|
|
Point is..it's is not going anywhere. With that being said, every network being on the same port leads way for a lot of potential threats:
|
|
|
|
* A new RCE is found for a very common IRC bot
|
|
* A new 0day is found for a certain IRCd version
|
|
* Old IRC daemons running versions with known CVE's
|
|
* Tracing users network/channel whereabouts
|
|
* Mass spamming attacks on every network
|
|
|
|
Mass scanning *default* ports of services is nothing new & though port 6667 is not a common target, running an IRCd on a **non-standard** port should be the **standard**. If we have learned anything in the last 10 years, using standard ports for *anything* is almost always smells like a bad idea.
|
|
|
|
![](.screens/base.png)
|
|
|
|
## Todo
|
|
* Built in identd
|
|
* Checking for IPv6 availability *(SSL= in 005 responses may help verify IPv6)*
|
|
* Support for IRC servers using old versions of SSL
|
|
* Create a seperate log for failed connections *(Sync to file every hour maybe)*
|
|
* Ability to link multiple IRCP instances running in daemon mode together for balancing
|
|
* Remote syncing the logs to another server
|
|
* Support for handling a target list that contains host:port:ssl for networks on non-standard ports
|
|
|
|
## Mirrors
|
|
- [acid.vegas](https://git.acid.vegas/ircp)
|
|
- [GitHub](https://github.com/acidvegas/ircp)
|
|
- [GitLab](https://gitlab.com/acidvegas/ircp)
|
|
- [SuperNETs](https://git.supernets.org/acidvegas/ircp) |