2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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/* This file contains both code from cURL and hostname
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* validation code from the ssl conservatory (in that order).
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*
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* The goal is that all this code won't be needed anymore once
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* everyone is running a recent OpenSSL/LibreSSL that has
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* X509_check_host(). Until that time, unfortunately, we need
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* these 400+ lines to do just that... -- Syzop, Sep/2017
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*/
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// Get rid of OSX 10.7 and greater deprecation warnings.
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#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__clang__)
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#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
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#endif
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "openssl_hostname_validation.h"
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#define HOSTNAME_MAX_SIZE 255
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#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
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#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data ASN1_STRING_data
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#endif
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/***************************************************************************
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* _ _ ____ _
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* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
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* / __| | | | |_) | |
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* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
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* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
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*
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* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
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* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
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* are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
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*
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* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
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* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
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* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
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*
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* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
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* KIND, either express or implied.
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*
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***************************************************************************/
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/* This file is an amalgamation of hostcheck.c and most of rawstr.c
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from cURL. The contents of the COPYING file mentioned above are:
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COPYRIGHT AND PERMISSION NOTICE
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Copyright (c) 1996 - 2013, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>.
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All rights reserved.
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Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any purpose
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with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
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notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. IN
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NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
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DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
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OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE
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OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
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Except as contained in this notice, the name of a copyright holder shall not
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be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or other dealings
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in this Software without prior written authorization of the copyright holder.
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*/
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/* Portable, consistent toupper (remember EBCDIC). Do not use toupper() because
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its behavior is altered by the current locale. */
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static char Curl_raw_toupper(char in)
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{
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switch (in) {
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case 'a':
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return 'A';
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case 'b':
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return 'B';
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case 'c':
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return 'C';
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case 'd':
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return 'D';
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case 'e':
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return 'E';
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case 'f':
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return 'F';
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case 'g':
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return 'G';
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case 'h':
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return 'H';
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case 'i':
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return 'I';
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case 'j':
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return 'J';
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case 'k':
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return 'K';
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case 'l':
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return 'L';
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case 'm':
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return 'M';
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case 'n':
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return 'N';
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case 'o':
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return 'O';
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case 'p':
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return 'P';
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case 'q':
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return 'Q';
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case 'r':
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return 'R';
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case 's':
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return 'S';
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case 't':
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return 'T';
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case 'u':
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return 'U';
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case 'v':
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return 'V';
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case 'w':
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return 'W';
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case 'x':
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return 'X';
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case 'y':
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return 'Y';
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case 'z':
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return 'Z';
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}
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return in;
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}
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/*
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* Curl_raw_equal() is for doing "raw" case insensitive strings. This is meant
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* to be locale independent and only compare strings we know are safe for
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* this. See http://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2008/10/15/strcasecmp-in-turkish/ for
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* some further explanation to why this function is necessary.
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*
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* The function is capable of comparing a-z case insensitively even for
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* non-ascii.
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*/
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static int Curl_raw_equal(const char *first, const char *second)
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{
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while(*first && *second) {
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (Curl_raw_toupper(*first) != Curl_raw_toupper(*second))
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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/* get out of the loop as soon as they don't match */
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break;
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first++;
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second++;
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}
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/* we do the comparison here (possibly again), just to make sure that if the
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loop above is skipped because one of the strings reached zero, we must not
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return this as a successful match */
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return (Curl_raw_toupper(*first) == Curl_raw_toupper(*second));
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}
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static int Curl_raw_nequal(const char *first, const char *second, size_t max)
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{
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while(*first && *second && max) {
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (Curl_raw_toupper(*first) != Curl_raw_toupper(*second)) {
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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break;
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}
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max--;
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first++;
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second++;
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}
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (0 == max)
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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return 1; /* they are equal this far */
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return Curl_raw_toupper(*first) == Curl_raw_toupper(*second);
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}
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/*
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* Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
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* E.g.
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* "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com".
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*
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* We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3.
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* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
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*/
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static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
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{
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const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
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int wildcard_enabled;
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size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
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pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (pattern_wildcard == NULL)
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
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CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
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/* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
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match. */
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wildcard_enabled = 1;
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pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end+1, '.') == NULL ||
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
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Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
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wildcard_enabled = 0;
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}
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (!wildcard_enabled)
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
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CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
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hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (hostname_label_end == NULL ||
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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!Curl_raw_equal(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end))
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return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
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/* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most
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label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label
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of the pattern. */
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern)
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
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prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
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suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard+1);
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return Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
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Curl_raw_nequal(pattern_wildcard+1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
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suffixlen) ?
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CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
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}
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int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
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{
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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!hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
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return 0;
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (Curl_raw_equal(hostname, match_pattern)) /* trivial case */
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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return 1;
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2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
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if (hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == CURL_HOST_MATCH)
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2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/* End of cURL related functions */
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/* Start of host validation code */
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/* Obtained from: https://github.com/iSECPartners/ssl-conservatory */
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/*
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Copyright (C) 2012, iSEC Partners.
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
|
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|
this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
|
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|
|
the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
|
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|
|
use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
|
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|
|
of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
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|
so, subject to the following conditions:
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|
|
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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|
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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|
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|
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|
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
|
|
|
|
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
|
|
|
|
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
|
|
|
|
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
|
|
|
|
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
|
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|
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
|
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SOFTWARE.
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*/
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/*
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* Helper functions to perform basic hostname validation using OpenSSL.
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*
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* Please read "everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-openssl.pdf" before
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* attempting to use this code. This whitepaper describes how the code works,
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* how it should be used, and what its limitations are.
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*
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* Author: Alban Diquet
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* License: See LICENSE
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*
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*/
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/**
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* Tries to find a match for hostname in the certificate's Common Name field.
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*
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* Returns MatchFound if a match was found.
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* Returns MatchNotFound if no matches were found.
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* Returns MalformedCertificate if the Common Name had a NUL character embedded in it.
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* Returns Error if the Common Name could not be extracted.
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*/
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static HostnameValidationResult matches_common_name(const char *hostname, const X509 *server_cert) {
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int common_name_loc = -1;
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X509_NAME_ENTRY *common_name_entry = NULL;
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ASN1_STRING *common_name_asn1 = NULL;
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const char *common_name_str = NULL;
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// Find the position of the CN field in the Subject field of the certificate
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common_name_loc = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name((X509 *) server_cert), NID_commonName, -1);
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if (common_name_loc < 0) {
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return Error;
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}
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// Extract the CN field
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common_name_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_get_subject_name((X509 *) server_cert), common_name_loc);
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if (common_name_entry == NULL) {
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return Error;
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}
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// Convert the CN field to a C string
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common_name_asn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(common_name_entry);
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if (common_name_asn1 == NULL) {
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return Error;
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}
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common_name_str = (char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(common_name_asn1);
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// Make sure there isn't an embedded NUL character in the CN
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if ((size_t)ASN1_STRING_length(common_name_asn1) != strlen(common_name_str)) {
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return MalformedCertificate;
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}
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// Compare expected hostname with the CN
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if (Curl_cert_hostcheck(common_name_str, hostname) == CURL_HOST_MATCH) {
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return MatchFound;
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}
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else {
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return MatchNotFound;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Tries to find a match for hostname in the certificate's Subject Alternative Name extension.
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*
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* Returns MatchFound if a match was found.
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* Returns MatchNotFound if no matches were found.
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* Returns MalformedCertificate if any of the hostnames had a NUL character embedded in it.
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* Returns NoSANPresent if the SAN extension was not present in the certificate.
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|
*/
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static HostnameValidationResult matches_subject_alternative_name(const char *hostname, const X509 *server_cert) {
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HostnameValidationResult result = MatchNotFound;
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int i;
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|
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int san_names_nb = -1;
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STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *san_names = NULL;
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|
|
// Try to extract the names within the SAN extension from the certificate
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|
|
san_names = X509_get_ext_d2i((X509 *) server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
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|
|
|
if (san_names == NULL) {
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|
|
return NoSANPresent;
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|
|
}
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|
|
|
san_names_nb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(san_names);
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|
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|
|
// Check each name within the extension
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<san_names_nb; i++) {
|
|
|
|
const GENERAL_NAME *current_name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(san_names, i);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (current_name->type == GEN_DNS) {
|
|
|
|
// Current name is a DNS name, let's check it
|
|
|
|
const char *dns_name = (char *) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(current_name->d.dNSName);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Make sure there isn't an embedded NUL character in the DNS name
|
|
|
|
if ((size_t)ASN1_STRING_length(current_name->d.dNSName) != strlen(dns_name)) {
|
|
|
|
result = MalformedCertificate;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else { // Compare expected hostname with the DNS name
|
|
|
|
if (Curl_cert_hostcheck(dns_name, hostname)
|
|
|
|
== CURL_HOST_MATCH) {
|
|
|
|
result = MatchFound;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(san_names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Validates the server's identity by looking for the expected hostname in the
|
|
|
|
* server's certificate. As described in RFC 6125, it first tries to find a match
|
|
|
|
* in the Subject Alternative Name extension. If the extension is not present in
|
|
|
|
* the certificate, it checks the Common Name instead.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns MatchFound if a match was found.
|
|
|
|
* Returns MatchNotFound if no matches were found.
|
|
|
|
* Returns MalformedCertificate if any of the hostnames had a NUL character embedded in it.
|
|
|
|
* Returns Error if there was an error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
HostnameValidationResult validate_hostname(const char *hostname, const X509 *server_cert) {
|
|
|
|
HostnameValidationResult result;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-15 05:16:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((hostname == NULL) || (server_cert == NULL))
|
2020-03-29 09:16:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return Error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// First try the Subject Alternative Names extension
|
|
|
|
result = matches_subject_alternative_name(hostname, server_cert);
|
|
|
|
if (result == NoSANPresent) {
|
|
|
|
// Extension was not found: try the Common Name
|
|
|
|
result = matches_common_name(hostname, server_cert);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|