That's what some widely used IRC servers do for their own services
(e.g. NickServ and ChanServ). This adds an additional level of
trust to make sure BouncerServ isn't typo'ed or impersonated.
This is a mecanical change, which just lifts up the context.TODO()
calls from inside the DB implementations to the callers.
Future work involves properly wiring up the contexts when it makes
sense.
See https://ircv3.net/specs/extensions/capability-negotiation
> Upon receiving either a CAP LS or CAP REQ command during connection
> registration, the server MUST not complete registration until the
> client sends a CAP END command to indicate that capability negotiation
> has ended.
This commit should prevent soju from trying to authenticate the user
prior to having received AUTHENTICATE messages, when the client eagerly
requests capabilities with CAP REQ seeing available capabilities
beforehand with CAP LS.
This allows users to set a default realname used if the per-network
realname isn't set.
A new "user update" command is introduced and can be extended to edit
other user properties and other users in the future.
Typically done via:
/notice $<bouncer> <message>
Or, for a connection not bound to a specific network:
/notice $* <message>
The message is broadcast as BouncerServ, because that's the only
user that can be trusted to belong to the bouncer by users. Any
other prefix would conflict with the upstream network.
The first MOTD upon connection is ignored, but subsequent MOTD messages
(requested by the "MOTD" message from the client, typically using a
/motd command) are forwarded.
In multi-upstream mode, we can't relay WHO/WHOIS messages for the
current user, because we can't decide which upstream server the
message should be relayed to.
In single-upstream server, we do know which upstream server to use,
so we can just blindly relay the message.
This allows users to send a self-WHO/WHOIS to check their cloak and
other information.
